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INTRODUCTION
A domestic-violence survivor receives a call from her former 
partner, against whom she has an order of protection. He threatens to 
kill her. Terrified, she takes her young children and plans to go to her 
grandmother’s home. On the way, she calls the police officer 
familiar with her history of domestic violence to report the violation 
of the order of protection. He assures her that her former partner will 
be arrested immediately and that she can go home. She returns to her 
apartment. The following morning, when she opens the door to take 
out her garbage, her former partner shoots her repeatedly with a gun. 
Law enforcement had not made any attempt to arrest him.
This deeply troubling scenario is a real case, resulting in 
litigation brought by the survivor, Carmen Valdez, against the City 
of New York.1 It is the type of situation that the movement to end 
gender-based violence in the United States, for the last forty years, 
has sought to prevent. Yet, police fail to carry out laws and policies 
designed to protect victims of gender-based violence every day, in 
communities across the country. 
This Article discusses how ratification by the United States of 
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) could strengthen law-
enforcement accountability for responding to and preventing 
violence against women and girls in the United States. Anti-violence 
advocacy in the United States has primarily focused on and funded 
criminal justice system interventions to address domestic and sexual 
violence. But in far too many communities, law-enforcement officers 
respond to domestic and sexual violence in dismissive, harmful, and 
biased ways, allowing those who commit violence to do so with 
impunity and withholding any semblance of governmental protection 
from survivors. The U.S. Supreme Court and some federal and state 
courts have contributed to this situation, denying legal remedies to 
survivors who seek to hold police departments accountable.
CEDAW ratification would empower survivors and advocates 
in a number of ways. First, CEDAW clearly establishes the 
government’s obligation to protect victims of gender-based violence 
as a fundamental element of the non-discrimination principle. It also 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73 (discussing Valdez v. City of 
New York, 960 N.E.2d 356, 368 (N.Y. 2011)). New York’s highest court later 
overturned an $8 million jury verdict against the city, concluding the police owed no 
duty to the victim. Valdez, 960 N.E.2d at 368. 
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provides a right to a remedy for the violence once it occurs. As I will 
discuss further, many U.S. courts resist recognizing a duty of law 
enforcement to address and prevent violence or discrimination 
against survivors of gender-based violence as a form of sex 
discrimination. Similarly, some courts have concluded there is no 
remedy for survivors who experience police misconduct when 
addressing domestic or sexual violence, either because police owe no 
legal duty to survivors or as a result of other legal doctrines that 
immunize the government from liability. 
Second, CEDAW and the human rights framework highlight 
the intersectionality analysis, which is particularly important in 
scrutinizing law-enforcement responses to violence. The 
intersectionality framework, unlike the standard civil rights 
paradigm, illuminates how multiple forms of discrimination 
frequently result in problematic policing of domestic and sexual 
violence in communities of color and immigrant communities, as 
well as other marginalized communities. For survivors, it is crucial 
to integrate an understanding of all aspects of their personhood—
rather than membership in individual protected classes—to both 
analyze law-enforcement responses and to move forward with 
reforms. 
Third, CEDAW could be used to transform the current U.S. 
movement to end gender-based violence, which has often chosen not 
to confront problematic policing practices. CEDAW provides 
mechanisms for rallying advocates around an affirmative framework 
of women’s human rights—including positive rights to life, security, 
and equality—and calling for greater governmental accountability. 
I. LAW-ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
As others have described,2 modern advocacy against violence 
against women in the United States originated in feminist thought 
and activism. Advocates in the late 1960s and 1970s viewed 
battering as the product of patriarchy and highlighted the 
government’s role in legitimizing and reinforcing the perpetration of 
2. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 
182-84 (2000); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the 
Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1666. 
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that violence.3 Yet, as the movement developed, it shifted from one 
at the margins challenging the state to one in the mainstream. The 
movement was successful in recharacterizing violence against 
women—in particular, intimate partner violence—as a crime of 
public concern requiring a police response.4 Much of the law reform 
work in the United States zeroed in on strengthening how law 
enforcement addressed gender-based violence. States adopted 
amendments to the criminal laws to encourage the arrest and 
prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence, and the 1994 
enactment of the federal Violence Against Women Act created 
funding streams for law-enforcement agencies as well as advocacy 
organizations to respond to survivors.5 Sexual assault laws were 
changed to relax requirements that a complainant’s report be 
corroborated and to include rape shield protections.6
Despite the significant changes in the legal framework and 
resources provided to policing domestic violence and sexual
violence, it is clear that law-enforcement responses continue to 
systemically fail survivors.7 In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) found that the New Orleans Police Department had engaged 
in widespread misconduct in responding to violence against women.8
With respect to sexual-violence complaints, officers had failed to 
follow basic sexual assault investigation processes, misclassified 
40%60% of sexual assault reports as “non-criminal,” questioned 
3. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 13, 20-22, 182; SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 29-79, 94, 201 (1982); Sack, supra note 2, at 1666.
4. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 4-5; Sack, supra note 2, at 1668-72.
5. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 5, 92, 183, 188-90.
6. Id. at 189; Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1319 & n.248, 
1333 (1994).
7. These failures have led many scholars and activists to challenge the 
wisdom of overreliance on criminal justice responses. See generally Leigh 
Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the 
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 
(2004); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM 
APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 37, 56, 161-65
(2008). This Article focuses on the experiences and rights of survivors who do 
choose to access the criminal justice system, while acknowledging the pressing need 
to create comprehensive solutions for survivors that move beyond criminalization. 
8. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, at ix, xi, 32, 43-51 (2011) [hereinafter NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE INVESTIGATION], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
spl/nopd_report.pdf. 
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victims in a manner that seemed focused on proving a victim’s 
allegations were false, and poorly carried out evidence collection and 
analysis.9 With regard to domestic violence, the department had no 
guidance in place for officers on how to interact with domestic-
violence survivors, did not provide adequate training to police who 
responded to the scene, and prohibited Domestic Violence Unit 
detectives from conducting fieldwork.10
In recent years, other departments’ deep-rooted biases against 
domestic- and sexual-violence survivors also have been exposed.
The Puerto Rico Police Department mishandled and misclassified 
sexual assault complaints, recording fewer sexual assaults than 
homicides.11 Moreover, the department did little to respond to 
extremely high rates of domestic-violence homicides as well as 
officer-committed domestic violence.12 While ninety-eight officers 
were arrested for committing domestic violence between 2007 and 
2010, eighty-four remained active, sending the message to survivors 
that the department did not take the offenses seriously.13 In Missoula, 
Montana, police officers consistently failed to gather appropriate 
evidence, discouraged victim participation in the criminal process, 
created barriers to trust with victims through their interview 
methods, and did not coordinate their work with community 
organizations.14 And Human Rights Watch documented similar 
problems at the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department, finding widespread misclassification of sexual assault 
complaints, among other serious deficiencies in police response.15
9. Id. at 45-49.
10. Id. at 49-51.
11. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT 57 (2011) [hereinafter PUERTO RICO POLICE 
INVESTIGATION], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
prpd_letter.pdf; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ISLAND OF IMPUNITY: PUERTO RICO’S
OUTLAW POLICE FORCE 17 (2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/islandofimpunity_20120619.pdf. 
12. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 103-17; PUERTO RICO 
POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 11, at 58.
13. PUERTO RICO POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 11, at 17.
14. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Mont., to 
John Engen, Mayor, City of Missoula, Mont., at 7-14 (May 15, 2013) [hereinafter 
Missoula County Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf.
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAPITOL OFFENSE: POLICE MISHANDLING OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 3-15 (2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0113ForUpload_2.pdf. 
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Discrimination against survivors of gender-based violence 
often intersects with other forms of discrimination to more severely 
penalize and jeopardize survivors from marginalized communities.16
Women of color, immigrant women, Native American women, 
lesbian women, and transgender people can face harsh consequences 
when reaching out to the police. Women of color requesting police 
assistance may be arrested themselves, based on racialized 
stereotypes about who constitutes a threat and who is a victim.17
Immigrant women may find that their complaints of violence are 
overshadowed by inquiries into their immigration status, leading to 
potential deportation.18 And Native American women’s reports of 
sexual assault by non-Native men frequently go completely 
unaddressed.19 Because tribes generally lack authority to prosecute 
non-Native perpetrators, Native women must depend on federal, and 
sometimes state, authorities; yet, it is well established that those 
authorities decline to investigate and prosecute at high rates,20 though 
tribal advocates have pushed recently for greater action. Lesbian 
women and transgender and queer people who report intimate-
partner or sexual violence to police frequently encounter 
unsympathetic or antagonistic attitudes; they also are subject to arrest 
16. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences on Her Visit to the United States of America, ¶¶ 50-66, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/26/Add.5 (June 6, 2011) (by Rashida Manjoo) [hereinafter 
Manjoo].
17. Id. ¶ 14; Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: 
Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 23-
33 (1998).
18. Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to 
Call for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 77-79 (2003); 
Manjoo, supra note 16, ¶ 59.
19. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 4-8, 17 (2007), available 
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf; Manjoo, supra note 16, ¶¶ 
64-65.
20. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 3
(2010); Manjoo, supra note 16, ¶¶ 65-66; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19, at 41-53, 
62-75. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 restored tribal 
jurisdiction over certain non-Native perpetrators of domestic and dating violence, 
but not over those who commit sexual assault. INDIAN LAW RES. CTR., RESTORING 
SAFETY TO NATIVE WOMEN AND STRENGTHENING NATIVE NATIONS 19-22 (2013), 
available at http://indianlaw.org/sites/default/files/TribalCapacityReport_Final.pdf.
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based on bias or misconceptions about how violence in same-sex 
relationships or against LGBT people is committed.21
Police bias against sexual- and domestic-violence survivors 
does not only manifest itself in the failure to effectively enforce the 
applicable criminal laws. In many jurisdictions across the country, 
law-enforcement agencies actively punish survivors who report 
crimes based on municipal ordinances that penalize tenants for calls 
to the police or for certain criminal or other activity occurring at the 
property. Police departments have enforced chronic nuisance
ordinances, also known as crime-free or disorderly-behavior 
ordinances, against victims of domestic violence, threatening them 
with eviction for reporting abuse and silencing them from making 
further reports.22 These laws and police enforcement of them 
exemplify how, despite progress in transforming laws to penalize 
gender-based violence, other governmental practices dramatically 
undermine survivors’ rights to seek protection from the state and 
instead empower perpetrators to commit crimes with impunity. 
Beyond civilian law enforcement, the military justice system 
also has ignored and penalized survivors of sexual violence who 
come forward. While sexual assault is perpetrated at high rates 
within the ranks, very few cases are ever prosecuted.23 Many victims 
do not report, and those who do all too frequently experience 
retaliation from the chain of command—who may prioritize unit 
harmony above meting out justice.24 The Feres doctrine, set out by 
21. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS (NCAVP), LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE IN 2012, at 10, 14-15, 20-21, 34, 47 (2013), available at
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_2012_ipvreport.final.pdf.
22. Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2013, at A1; EMILY WERTH, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON 
POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY 
ORDINANCES (2013), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/
files/files/housing-justice/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf; Matthew Desmond & Nicol 
Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for 
Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117 (2012) (documenting how domestic 
violence was the third most cited reason for triggering Milwaukee’s nuisance 
ordinance); Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying 
Chronic Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2008). 
23. LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
TWICE BETRAYED: BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE U.S. MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PROBLEM 5, 9, 14-15, 22 (2013), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/MilitarySexualAssaults.pdf.
24. Id. at 11, 14-15.
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the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950, bars service members who are 
sexually assaulted from bringing Federal Tort Claims Act claims 
against the government.25 The doctrine has also been extended to 
constitutional claims, depriving survivors of civil remedies when the 
military justice system fails them.26
Thus, despite the reforms and resources focused on 
strengthening law-enforcement response to violence against women 
and girls in the United States, many survivors will experience 
hostility, distrust, ignorance, dismissal, and direct and damaging 
consequences when they report the violence to relevant law-
enforcement authorities. The need for systemic transformation of 
criminal justice response is clear. CEDAW ratification would serve 
as a meaningful tool for such advocacy.
II. HOW CEDAW COULD TRANSFORM U.S. LAW ON LAW-
ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Ratification of CEDAW would allow survivors to rely on the 
international human rights framework to shift how federal, state, and 
local law-enforcement agencies address violence. Most significantly,
the framework provides a useful response to federal and state courts, 
which in many instances have set a high threshold for finding that 
discrimination against survivors of gender-based violence is a form 
of sex discrimination, refused to recognize a duty of law enforcement 
to address and prevent violence, and denied any remedy to survivors 
for police misconduct when addressing domestic or sexual violence. 
The ability to invoke the non-discrimination and due diligence 
principles of CEDAW in U.S. advocacy would help reshape our 
understanding of survivors’ rights to equality, protection, and 
remedies. 
A. CEDAW’s Approach to Gender-Based Violence
CEDAW provides a strong legal framework governing 
governmental duty to survivors of gender-based violence. While 
CEDAW’s text does not specifically discuss gender-based violence, 
it prohibits any form of discrimination against women, including any 
“distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
25. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
26. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
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enjoyment, or exercise by women . . . of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”27 General Recommendations 12 and 19, 
issued by the CEDAW Committee, explain how this principle 
applies to violence against women.28 General Recommendation 12 
recognizes that governments have an obligation to protect against 
violence occurring against women within the family or in other areas 
of social life.29 General Recommendation 19 provides that freedom 
from gender-based violence, whether committed by private or public 
actors, is included within the right to freedom from discrimination.30
Articulating freedom from gender-based violence as essential to 
equality is central to CEDAW’s understanding of violence against 
women and girls. General Recommendation 19 also describes how 
gender-based violence implicates other human rights, including:  
(a) The right to life; 
(b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; . . . 
(d) The right to liberty and security of person; 
(e) The right to equal protection under the law; 
(f) The right to equality in the family; [and] . . . 
(h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work.31
CEDAW, and international human rights law generally, 
emphasizes that “[s]tates may also be responsible for private acts if 
they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation” to the victim.32 General Recommendation 19 further 
elaborates, stating that governments should, among other measures: 
27. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
28. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 8th Sess., Feb. 20-Mar. 3, 1989, ¶ 392, U.N. Doc. A/44/38, Annex 
V; GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1980) [hereinafter 8th Sess. Report]; Rep. of 
the Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 11th 
Sess., Jan. 20-30, 1992, at 1-8, U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 
(1993) [hereinafter 11th Sess. Report]. While general recommendations are not 
legally binding, they serve as guidance on how to interpret CEDAW’s text.
29. 8th Sess. Report, supra note 28.
30. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 28, at 1-2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2, 6.
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take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-
based violence, whether by public or private act; . . . ensure that laws 
against . . . gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women, 
and respect their integrity and dignity[; provide a]ppropriate protective 
and supportive services; [provide g]ender-sensitive training of judicial and 
law enforcement officers; [and provide] effective complaints procedures 
and remedies, including compensation.33
The CEDAW Committee has applied these principles in 
individual cases filed with it.34 In A.T. v. Hungary, the Committee 
found that Hungary’s laws and practices did not provide 
comprehensive or effective protection to victims of domestic 
violence.35 A.T. had experienced severe physical domestic violence 
committed by her husband for four years; yet, the police never 
detained him, and the court cases against him dragged on. Moreover, 
A.T. was unable to seek a protection order because Hungary’s laws 
did not authorize such orders, and there was no shelter available for 
her and her children. Invoking the due diligence principle, the 
Committee concluded that Hungary had violated CEDAW’s anti-
discrimination guarantees by failing to prevent and protect against 
violence against women and stated that the government should 
provide her with “reparation proportionate to the physical and mental 
harm undergone and to the gravity of the violations of her rights.”36
Similarly, in two cases involving Austria—Goekce v. Austria and 
Yildirim v. Austria—the Committee concluded that there had been 
violations of due diligence when the police failed to respond in a 
timely manner to serious incidents of domestic violence and when 
the perpetrators were not detained.37 The Committee further 
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. The Optional Protocol of CEDAW authorizes victims to bring 
complaints about CEDAW violations before the CEDAW Committee and also 
allows the Committee to conduct inquiries into serious and systematic abuses of 
human rights. G.A. Res. 54/4, art. 2, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
While 187 countries have ratified or acceded to CEDAW, only eighty countries have 
assented to the Optional Protocol. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
35. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Communication No. 2/2003, 32nd Sess. Jan. 10–28 2005, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005) [hereinafter A.T. v. Hungary].
36. Id. at ¶ 9.6 I(b).
37. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Communication No. 5/2005, 39th Sess., Jul. 23–Aug. 10, 2007, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Goekce v. Austria]; United 
Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
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determined that even though the perpetrators were ultimately 
convicted for killing their former partners, the victims’ human rights 
were violated because no action was taken to prevent the violence or 
protect the victims when the state had the opportunity to do so.38
Thus, CEDAW takes a holistic view of the rights of women 
and girls as it relates to gender-based violence. Governments must 
work to prevent such violence and, when it occurs, to provide 
protection and remedies for it. Refusing to address violence until it 
has escalated to extremely serious injury or homicide is insufficient, 
as by that point the system has failed the victim. And providing 
services after the fact also does not satisfy the government’s duty, as 
services do not necessarily prevent future violence or adequately 
compensate for and remedy the effects of violence that has already 
been committed.
B. Recognizing Gender-Based Violence as a Form of Discrimination 
Against Women and Girls in the United States 
CEDAW’s recognition of gender-based violence as a form of 
sex discrimination provides a compelling lens through which to 
understand governmental actions designed to end such violence, as 
well as governmental actions that discriminate against survivors. The 
concept of gender-based violence as a violation of women’s rights to 
equality has not consistently gained traction in U.S. law. The 1994 
Violence Against Women Act created, for the first time, a federal 
civil rights remedy that could be pursued by survivors of gender-
based violence against perpetrators.39 Following years of 
congressional hearings and investigation, Congress concluded that 
the remedy was an appropriate exercise of both its Commerce Clause 
power and under the Fourteenth Amendment. Of particular relevance 
Communication No. 6/2005, 39th Sess., Jul. 23–Aug. 10, 2007, U.N. Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Yildirim v. Austria]. 
38. Goecke v. Austria, supra note 37, at ¶¶ 12.1.5-12.1.6; Yildirim v. 
Austria, supra note 37, at ¶¶ 12.1.5-12.1.6.
39. The provision creating the civil rights remedy reads as follows: 
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime 
of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right 
declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party 
injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court 
may deem appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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here, Congress found that discrimination against survivors by state 
law-enforcement authorities and courts provided a sufficient basis to 
create a remedy that would confront both the bias inherent in gender-
motivated violence and governmental responses to it.40 Yet, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in United States v. Morrison, rejected the equality 
argument as a ground upon which the law could stand.41 Instead, the 
Court narrowed the type of discrimination that could be reached 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment: the civil rights remedy “is 
not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the 
Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not 
at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed 
criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”42 The Court struck down the 
civil rights remedy based on federalism concerns, limiting the ability 
of the federal government to give options to survivors who faced 
discrimination from state justice systems when experiencing violence 
perpetrated by non-state actors.43
In contrast, CEDAW acknowledges that unless gender-based 
violence by private actors is prevented and addressed by the 
government, women cannot be truly equal.44 Its ratification could 
thus be helpful in supporting federal and state equal-protection 
claims brought by survivors of gender-based violence challenging 
discriminatory law-enforcement practices.45 This type of claim has 
been brought in many jurisdictions, typically targeting the systematic 
failure of police departments to respond effectively to domestic and 
sexual violence. Courts generally have required the showing of a 
40. Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women 
Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 70-82, 85-93
(2002).
41. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. Id. at 626.
43. Some states, however, have enacted versions of the civil rights remedy. 
Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women 
Act: Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165 n.42, 167 n.55, 180 
(2005).
44. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 28, at 1-2.
45. While CEDAW, even if ratified, would most likely not be treated as 
self-executing, it would serve as persuasive authority in U.S. cases. Human rights 
treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the 
land, U.S. CONST. art. VI, and customary international law shares a similar status. 
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). United States laws 
should be construed to be consistent with international law whenever possible. See, 
e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin 
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252-53 (1984).
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policy or practice of providing less protection to victims of gender-
based violence than other victims, as well as evidence that 
discrimination against women was a motivating factor.46 Establishing 
intent can be difficult, though courts have accepted evidence of 
statistical differences in arrest rates, training of officers to “defuse” 
rather than arrest in domestic-violence cases, and comments about 
not blaming a husband for being abusive toward a victim as 
indicating discriminatory motive.47 The DOJ has looked to similar 
types of evidence when finding equal-protection violations by local 
law-enforcement agencies.48 CEDAW’s recognition of violence 
against women as a form of sex discrimination would bolster the 
ability of survivors to establish intent, as it situates both the violence 
and problematic law enforcement response to the violence in gender 
bias. This principle could be especially helpful in developing claims 
in states with Equal Rights Amendments (ERAs). Very few cases 
have been brought based on ERAs, and it is unclear whether 
discriminatory intent will be required in most states.49 In some states, 
proof of discriminatory impact on women may be sufficient.50
CEDAW’s understanding of non-discrimination in the context of 
violence against women and girls would contribute meaningfully to 
the development of law in this area.
C. Recognizing Law Enforcement’s Duty to Protect Survivors of 
Gender-Based Violence
Another major barrier to holding law enforcement accountable 
for failures to protect victims of domestic and sexual violence in the 
United States is the reluctance of courts to impose any sort of duty 
46. Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. 
City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th 
Cir. 1996); Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203, 1212-13 (N.D. Ohio 1994); 
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984).
47. Watson, 857 F.2d at 695-96; Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701; Smith, 857 F. 
Supp. at 1212.
48. NEW ORLEANS POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 32-33; PUERTO 
RICO POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 11, at 58; Missoula County Letter, supra 
note 14, at 4-6. 
49. Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: 
Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination,
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1256-59, 1275-78 (2005).
50. Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home Revisited: The New Mexico Equal 
Rights Amendment After New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 40 N.M.
L. REV. 215, 215 n.4, 218 (2010).
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on the government when private individuals perpetrate the violence. 
Thus, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there was no substantive due process right to 
protection, except where the victim is in the state’s control or where 
the state creates the danger.51 Castle Rock v. Gonzales closed off 
another constitutional remedy to victims, holding that they have no 
procedural due process right to enforcement of restraining orders.52
Together, these cases absolve governments from a duty to protect 
many victims of gender-based violence, even when a perpetrator 
violates a judicial order that is seen as a primary tool to protect 
victims, and even when state law mandates police action.
In stark contrast, CEDAW clearly sets out a duty to protect 
survivors.53 Comparing the Supreme Court’s discussion of police 
duty with the CEDAW Committee’s illustrates the divergent 
approaches. In Castle Rock, the Court refused to recognize that the 
police had a duty to enforce Ms. Gonzales’s protective order when 
her ex-husband violated it by abducting their three daughters, despite 
a long history of domestic violence, even though state law required 
enforcement.54 The Court instead suggested that protection of victims 
serves private ends that fall outside the Constitution’s reach. 
Even if the statute could be said to have made enforcement of restraining 
orders “mandatory” because of the domestic-violence context of the 
underlying statute, that would not necessarily mean that state law gave 
respondent an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate. Making the 
actions of government employees obligatory can serve various legitimate 
ends other than the conferral of a benefit on a specific class of people. The 
serving of public rather than private ends is the normal course of the 
criminal law because criminal acts, “besides the injury [they do] to
individuals, strike at the very being of society; which cannot possibly 
subsist, where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity.”55
Only two years later, the CEDAW Committee came to very 
different conclusions when faced with a petition brought by the 
family of a domestic-violence victim whose requests for police 
assistance had largely gone unanswered, resulting in her murder.
>7@KH SROLFH NQHZ RU VKRXOG KDYH NQRZQ WKDW ùDKLGH *RHNFH ZDV LQ
serious danger; they should have treated the last call from her as an 
51. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 
197, 199-200 (1989).
52. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
53. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 28, at 2, 4.
54. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 753, 759, 768.
55. Id. at 764-65 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769)).
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emergency, in particular because Mustafa Goekce had shown that he had 
the potential to be a very dangerous and violent criminal. The Committee 
considers that in light of the long record of earlier disturbances and 
battering, by not responding to the call immediately, the police are 
DFFRXQWDEOH IRU IDLOLQJ WR H[HUFLVH GXH GLOLJHQFH WR SURWHFW ùDKLGH
Goekce.56
The Committee placed the failure to protect squarely on the 
government, connecting the duty to protect with their obligations 
under international human rights law.57
Indeed, when Ms. Gonzales (later known as Lenahan) filed a 
petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
following the Supreme Court decision, the Commission concluded 
that the government had violated her human rights to life, non-
discrimination, and judicial protection.58 The Commission’s decision 
echoed the core principle of CEDAW that “a State’s failure to act 
with due diligence to protect women from violence constitutes a 
form of discrimination, and denies women their right to equality 
before the law.”59 The Commission stressed that what might be seen 
as state acts of omission can fuel already dangerous situations: “State 
inaction towards cases of violence against women fosters an 
environment of impunity and promotes the repetition of violence 
‘since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the 
representative of the society, to take effective action to sanction such 
acts.’”60 The decision ordered individual remedies for Ms. Lenahan, 
as well as systemic reforms.61
CEDAW’s articulation of due diligence would strengthen 
victims’ arguments about the duty to protect in the United States.62 In 
federal and state substantive due process cases, victims of gender-
based violence typically must establish that an affirmative action by 
the law-enforcement officer increased the danger they faced in order 
56. Goecke v. Austria, supra note 37, at ¶ 12.1.14. 
57. Id.
58. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142, doc. 11 (2011). 
59. Id. ¶ 111.
60. Id. ¶ 168 (quoting Maria Da Penha Fernandes (Brazil), Case 12.051, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 56 
(2001)).
61. Id. ¶ 201.
62. Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Implementing the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights’ Domestic-Violence Ruling, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
113, 115-17 (2012); see also Julie Goldscheid, Rethinking Civil Rights and Gender 
Violence, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 49-50 (2013).
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to fall within the DeShaney exception.63 Thus, situations where the 
officer explicitly or implicitly sanctions private violence by not 
arresting a domestic-violence perpetrator, despite seeing bruises on 
the victim, and instead talking about football with him, could 
qualify.64 Or cases involving nuisance ordinances, where the 
municipality passes a law punishing victims for calling the police 
and thereby sets up state-protection-free zones around their homes, 
should satisfy the affirmative act element.65
Yet, in other cases, the analysis is more difficult, as misconduct 
by officers in responding to violence can often be characterized as 
acts of omission.66 For example, in the Valdez v. City of New York
case,67 the case referred to at the start of this Article, if the plaintiff 
had brought a substantive due process claim, would a court have 
seen the officer’s assurance of an immediate arrest as an affirmative 
act? Or would a court have dismissed this as a case where the officer 
failed to arrest? Given this analytical ambiguity, the due diligence 
obligation can be used to shed light on the contours of substantive 
due process post-DeShaney, for “[t]he search for substantive due
process . . . is a search for fundamental ‘human rights’ [that] invites 
consideration of international values.”68 Due diligence offers a more 
holistic framework through which to interpret state action that 
creates danger, acknowledging the state’s role in sanctioning 
violence through repeated refusal to carry out laws protecting victims 
of gender-based violence. 
Likewise, in state negligence cases, CEDAW’s due diligence 
standard would help survivors respond to arguments that law 
63. See, e.g., Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 
415, 427-28 (2d Cir. 2009); Burella v. City of Phila., 501 F.3d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir. 
2007); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 597-600 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Okin, 577 F.3d at 430; see also Pearce v. Estate of Longo, 766 F. Supp. 
2d 367, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Pearce v. Labella, 
473 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012).
65. Cf. Okin, 577 F.3d at 429 (“The affirmative conduct of a government 
official may give rise to an actionable due process violation if it communicates, 
explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence.”).
66. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 
TOURO L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2007); Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 282 
(3d Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that the line between action and inaction may not 
always be clear). 
67. Valdez v. City of New York, 960 N.E.2d 356 (N.Y. 2011).
68. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 80-81 (2006) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
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enforcement owed no duty to them.69 Victims must generally 
establish a special relationship with the government in order to 
overcome the public-duty doctrine bar to municipal liability for 
negligence.70 In Valdez, the highest court in New York held that the 
victim did not establish a special relationship because she had not 
justifiably relied on the police statement that her abuser would be 
arrested immediately.71 The decision is a deeply troubling one, as it 
sends the message to survivors that police can choose whether to 
enforce orders of protection and cannot be held to any assurances 
that they affirmatively make, even in a case where they take no steps 
whatsoever to do what they said they would do.72 Despite state laws 
that encourage victims to report and that mandate arrest in many 
domestic-violence situations, the Valdez decision sets the bar high, 
perhaps unreachably high, to establish the “special relationship” 
between the police and a victim.73
Departing from the New York Court of Appeals in Valdez,
other state courts have emphasized that the text and intent behind 
their state domestic-violence criminal laws support finding municipal 
liability for law-enforcement failure to protect. In Illinois, the highest 
court concluded that domestic-violence victims could bring suit 
against the government where police willfully failed to enforce the 
law.74 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court permitted the estate 
of a domestic-violence victim to recover where an officer failed to 
take reasonable safety precautions when serving a protective order.75
CEDAW could provide additional persuasive authority for the 
special-relationship analysis, as a source of law—in addition to state 
statutes and policies—that supports a finding of law-enforcement 
duty when the police act negligently in addressing gender-based 
69. Sarah Rogerson, Domesticating Due Diligence: Municipal Tort 
Litigation’s Potential to Address Failed Enforcement of Orders of Protection, 21 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 289 (2012).
70. For elaboration on the special relationship inquiry, see Licia A. Esposito 
Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure 
to Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R.5th 273 (2001); Rogerson, supra 
note 69, at 324-25.
71. Valdez, 960 N.E.2d 356.
72. Id. at 369-71 (Lippman, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 373-74. Indeed, even if the court had found that Ms. Valdez had 
established the requisite special relationship with the police, she still would have 
needed to overcome the general shield of municipal immunity to hold the city liable. 
Id. at 365 (majority opinion).
74. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. 2006); Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 
659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1995).
75. Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 310 P.3d 1275 (Wash. 2013).
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violence. The question of whether a special relationship exists must 
encompass consideration of whether holding law enforcement 
accountable in a case advances the state’s interest in effectively 
responding to violence. A myopic focus on exempting municipalities 
from liability ignores the dramatic change in state laws and policies 
regarding gender-based violence that has taken place over the last 
few decades. CEDAW places these reforms—as well as litigation 
challenging law enforcement’s failure to carry them out—in context, 
as tools for fulfilling states’ due diligence obligations. 
D. Recognizing the Right to a Remedy for Survivors of Gender-
Based Violence
As part of the due diligence obligation, CEDAW also stresses 
providing remedies to survivors of gender-based violence. This not 
only includes compensation and protection for the individual, but 
also comprehensively changing the law-enforcement response to 
ensure that violence and discrimination do not recur.76
Access to remedies can take many forms. As discussed above, 
litigation is certainly one important mechanism within the United 
States. The duty of the state to provide survivors with remedies 
should be a factor when courts are interpreting how the law applies 
to claims brought to hold law enforcement accountable for 
discriminatory conduct. While Morrison ended the federal civil 
rights remedy, equal protection, due process, and negligence claims 
remain viable options in many situations,77 but largely turn on how 
courts interpret the state’s duty to respond to violence perpetrated by 
private actors. In this analysis, a key consideration should be whether 
denying the claim would foreclose any remedy to the survivor—an
outcome that CEDAW and international human rights law forbids. In 
76. 11th Sess. Report, supra note 28, at 1-2.
77. Service members who experience sexual assault present perhaps the 
starkest examples of survivors with no recourse when confronted with a military 
justice system that routinely refuses to address violence within its ranks. They have 
little power to influence any decisions made by the chain of command about their 
cases, and, thus far, courts have barred them from bringing Federal Tort Act Claims 
as well as constitutional claims against the government. See, e.g., Cioca v. 
Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013); Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 
2013); see also Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of Intra-Military 
Sexual Assault Claims, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 723, 725, 728-29 (2013); 
Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign 
Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 79 
(2003).
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Castle Rock, the Supreme Court suggested that denying survivors the 
possibility of federal due process claims was mitigated because the 
state could provide them with a remedy.78 However, it did not 
acknowledge that current Colorado law made any such claim 
impossible to sustain.79 Pointing to hypothetical legislative actions is 
a far cry from realizing a right to an actual remedy.
Other than private litigation, what remedies currently exist for
survivors seeking redress for law enforcement misconduct? The 
standard state and federal victim-compensation schemes typically 
provide funds to victims collected from perpetrators, but do not 
provide a mechanism for survivors seeking to change the way a law-
enforcement agency responds to victims.80 Survivors may be able to 
file complaints with police departments for internal investigation or 
with external police oversight bodies, including civil complaint 
review boards. However, those mechanisms generally are not 
designed or prepared to respond to police misconduct relating to 
gender-based violence.81
Some jurisdictions have agreed to alternate arrangements 
through which law-enforcement agencies voluntarily submit to 
oversight by an external panel of stakeholders. In Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, the police departments share information about the 
handling of sexual-assault complaints on a regular basis with a panel 
that includes sexual-assault advocates for review.82 The panel 
examines how complaints were classified, investigated, and disposed 
of and communicates with the department about problematic cases.83
Consent decrees entered into by the DOJ with local departments 
similarly create a monitor who will assess the departments’ 
performances in policing of domestic and sexual violence.84
78. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
79. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Pet. 1490-05, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22 ¶¶ 47-50 (2007).
80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (2012).
81. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 160.
82. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES,




84. Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, United 
States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW (entered January 11, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/nopd_
agreement_1-11-13.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF MISSOULA 
REGARDING THE MISSOULA POLICE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT 
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International human rights laws focus on remedies that could be used 
to advocate for similar mechanisms in other jurisdictions with 
problematic policing practices.
CEDAW’s requirement of remedies for survivors could also 
strengthen arguments for federal oversight over local law-
enforcement agencies. For the first time, in 2011, the DOJ exercised 
its authority to investigate how a police department responds to 
domestic and sexual violence in New Orleans.85 It continued this 
work pursuant to two federal laws86 in Puerto Rico;87 Missoula, 
Montana;88 and Maricopa County, Arizona.89 Advocates have pointed 
to this work, as well as the Lenahan decision, to urge the DOJ to 
integrate gender-based violence as a key component of police 
oversight. The DOJ took an important step forward in June 2013, 
issuing a statement announcing that addressing gender bias is a top 
priority of the Civil Rights Division, which is charged with law-
enforcement oversight.90
And of course, if CEDAW and the Optional Protocol91 were 
ratified, the CEDAW Committee itself could be an additional venue 
to seek individual and systemic relief. The Inter-American 
Commission served that role with respect to the Lenahan case, 
giving Ms. Lenahan an opportunity to testify and receive an 
11-12 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/missoulapdsettle_5-15-13.pdf; Agreement for the Sustainable Reform of 
the Puerto Rico Police Department at 82, United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, No. 3:12-cv-2039 (GAG) (D.P.R. July 17, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ documents/prpd_agreement_7-17-13.pdf.
85. NEW ORLEANS POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at xi, 43-51;
Landmark Finding of Gender Bias by U.S. Department of Justice in New Orleans 
Police Department, WOMEN’S L. PROJECT (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.womenslawproject.org/NewPages/wkVAW_GenderBias_NOPD.html.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012); id. § 3789(d).
87. PUERTO RICO POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 11, at 57-58.
88. Missoula County Letter, supra note 14 (regarding the United States’ 
investigation of the Missoula, Montana police department).
89. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney, Maricopa Cnty., at 
15, 16 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Maricopa Cnty. Letter], available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf 
(regarding the United States’ investigation of the Maricopa County, Arizona 
sheriff’s office).
90. Office on Violence Against Women, Joint Statement of the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the 
Office on Violence Against Women on Addressing Gender-Discrimination in 
Policing, OVW BLOG (June 20, 2013), http://blogs.justice.gov/ovw/archives/2406.
91. G.A. Res. 54/4, supra note 34.
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adjudication regarding the violation of her rights after the Supreme 
Court dismissed her case.92 The Commission continues to meet 
regularly with the parties to monitor compliance with its 
recommendations, including the individual remedies ordered for Ms. 
Lenahan.93 The CEDAW Committee would be a valuable option for 
other survivors, particularly given the limited capacity and resources 
of the Inter-American Commission. Given the United Nations’ 
visibility, the CEDAW Committee’s consideration of any violations 
in the United States would emphasize the importance of access to 
justice for survivors. While international human rights bodies cannot 
provide remedies that are fully comparable to domestic remedies, 
they can play a vital role in offering relief to survivors who 
otherwise would have no recourse.
III. HOW CEDAW COULD TRANSFORM THE ANALYSIS OF LAW-
ENFORCEMENT DISCRIMINATION TOWARDS SURVIVORS OF 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
Currently, U.S. law typically does not look at how multiple 
layers of discrimination may intersect. Instead, protected classes—
whether race, sex, or national origin—are often analyzed separately, 
with white people compared to people of color, women to men, and 
those born in the United States to those who are not.94 This lens 
zooms in narrowly on one aspect of identity and discrimination, 
while ignoring others. It is this approach that informed the system for 
law-enforcement response to gender-based violence in place today, 
including the dearth of mechanisms for accountability.
Reforming law-enforcement responses to gender-based 
violence in the United States must particularly account for the 
multiple forms of discrimination and violence that different people 
experience. As academics and advocates have recognized, anti-
violence interventions aimed at addressing only the violence but that 
do not analyze women’s larger realities—including bias they 
92. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Introduction: Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. 
United States: Implementation, Litigation, and Mobilization Strategies, 21 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 215-16 (2012); Lenora M. Lapidus, The Role of 
International Bodies in Influencing U.S. Policy to End Violence Against Women, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 534-35, 552-53 (2008).
93. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 92, at 215-16.
94. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE 
L.J. 728, 765-66 (2011); Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An 
Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
991, 1002-04, 1017 (2011). 
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confront based on race, class, sexual orientation, immigration status, 
and other core aspects of identity and social location—do not 
challenge the basic inequalities and discrimination that cause gender-
based violence.95 This is particularly true for policing practices, 
given the problematic and complicated relationships between law 
enforcement and many communities. 
Many have raised these concerns; yet, law enforcement 
practices that have a harmful impact on marginalized people in many 
communities remain entrenched. For example, it is well documented 
that in some communities, police have enforced domestic-violence 
laws by arresting both parties, particularly in states with mandatory 
arrest laws.96 This practice disproportionately affects women of color 
who report domestic violence, leading to even greater distrust of law 
enforcement.97 While many states reformed their laws to disfavor 
dual arrests and to require police to engage in a primary-aggressor 
analysis before carrying out an arrest, these changes did not 
comprehensively address the problem of undue arrests of domestic-
violence survivors who are women of color because they do not 
attack law-enforcement bias.98 Immigrant communities have 
experienced similar issues. While the Violence Against Women Act 
specifically created new immigration remedies for survivors of 
gender-based violence that benefit many survivors, other 
immigration policies—such as the Secure Communities program, 
which encourages local law-enforcement agencies to detain 
removable immigrants for U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement—can sweep survivors who report violence into 
removal proceedings.99 And many survivors cannot access remedies 
95. See, e.g., Manjoo, supra note 16, ¶¶ 17-20; Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Geneva Brown, Ain’t I a Victim? 
The Intersectionality of Race, Class, and Gender in Domestic Violence and the 
Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 147 (2012); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of 
Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1505, 1507, 1571-72 (1998).
96. David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: 
To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256 (2007).
97. MARY E. GILFUS, VAWNET, WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES OF ABUSE AS A 
RISK FACTOR FOR INCARCERATION 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_files_VAWnet/AR_Incarceration.pdf.
98. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 2, at 1690-91.
99. Leslye E. Orloff & Janice V. Kaguyutan, Immigrant Women Program 
of NOW Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for 
Battered Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U. J.
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like U Visas, which provide a pathway to lawful permanent 
residence for victims of crimes like domestic violence who work 
with law enforcement, because their local law-enforcement agency 
generally refuses to certify victims’ cooperation.100
International human rights law fortifies advocacy in support of 
survivors because it places the intersectionality analysis front and 
center. As Rashida Manjoo, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, has written: “[Intersectionality] explicitly 
interrogates the places where violence against women coincides with 
multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and their attendant 
inequalities.”101 This analysis not only recognizes how gender-based 
violence constitutes a form of sex discrimination, but also examines 
how women are subjected to violence based on their race, national 
origin, ability, religion, sexual orientation, and other identities. It 
stresses that the “elimination of violence requires holistic measures 
that address both inter-gender and intra-gender inequality and 
discrimination.”102
How would the analysis of law-enforcement response and 
accountability in the United States change using an intersectionality 
lens? The lived experiences of women of diverse backgrounds and 
communities would be the basis for designing reforms. For women 
of color, the recognition that they confront police bias and brutality 
in their communities would influence how law-enforcement 
interventions would be sought and structured. Policing policies 
would be examined to see how they might distinctly impact women 
of color. For example, one study of a chronic nuisance ordinance in 
Milwaukee found that police enforced the ordinance against 
domestic-violence victims, leading to their eviction, and that 
enforcement disproportionately harmed African-American women.103
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 97-99 (2002); Stephanie Kang, Note, A Rose by Any 
Other Name: The Chilling Effect of ICE’s “Secure” Communities Program, 9 
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 83, 96 (2012).
100. Orloff et al., supra note 18, at 77-79; Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual 
Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Duel, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 373, 392-405 (2010). 
101. Manjoo, supra note 16, ¶ 50. 
102. Id. ¶ 20 (“The holistic approach requires rights to be treated as 
universal, interdependent and indivisible; situating violence on a continuum that 
spans interpersonal and structural violence; accounting for both individual and 
structural discrimination, including structural and institutional inequalities; and 
analyzing social and/or economic hierarchies among women, and between women 
and men, i.e. both intra- and inter-gender.”).
103. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 22, at 118.
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The authors concluded that this type of ordinance denied police 
protection to African-American women and contributed to their 
housing insecurities.104 Yet, these ordinances proliferate across the 
country, with little consideration of their impact on women of color, 
domestic-violence victims, and domestic-violence victims who are 
women of color. For immigrants, an explicit prioritization of 
investigating gender-based violence would restore local law 
enforcement’s role in the criminal justice system and not divert 
resources toward the removal of immigrants.105 For all marginalized 
communities, the inability to hold police accountable for misconduct 
would highlight the importance of creating mechanisms for oversight 
when it comes to policing gender-based violence, as well as other 
law-enforcement interventions. And programs that provide for 
women’s legal, economic, and political empowerment would be 
given greater weight and resources, so as to tackle the root causes of 
gender-based violence and the state’s refusal to address them.
These are just a few examples of the many shifts in law and 
policy relating to law-enforcement response and accountability that 
could occur if stakeholders consistently employed an intersectional 
analysis. CEDAW’s holistic approach to understanding and ending 
violence would help respond to the failure of U.S. advocacy thus far 
to fully embrace the lives and experiences of all survivors when 
crafting criminal justice responses to gender-based violence.
IV. HOW CEDAW COULD TRANSFORM THE MOVEMENT TO END
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
If ratified, CEDAW would not only provide a stronger 
analytical and legal foundation for reforming policing practices, but  
could also be a vehicle for transforming the U.S. movement to end 
gender-based violence. As recognized by many advocates, the 
current movement has become reactive, focused on punishing 
individual perpetrators and providing services to individuals rather 
than creating deeper and more lasting social change.106 Activists have 
104. Id. at 137-38.
105. The Department of Justice already has identified this concern, opening 
an investigation into whether the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office engaged in 
racial profiling in order to detain immigrants and ignored sexual assault complaints 
reported by Latinas. Maricopa Cnty. Letter, supra note 89, at 6, 7, 15, 16.
106. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-
First Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 358 (2008); 
Goldscheid, supra note 62, at 49-50, 57. 
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called for a radical shift in the movement, pivoting towards visions 
that place the concerns of historically marginalized women at the 
center and that work towards a society where all women and girls are 
safe and valued.107
Ratification of CEDAW would contribute to this vision by 
creating a new lens through which most advocates do their work. 
CEDAW’s emphasis on gender-based violence, as rooted in the 
subordination of women and girls and other forms of discrimination, 
would revitalize the movement by encouraging political and social 
action and governmental accountability. Up to this point, policing 
practices have largely been dictated by law-enforcement 
perspectives, rather than how survivors and communities want or 
need to access law-enforcement services or the impact of criminal 
justice interventions. Thus, the anti-violence agenda has been 
diverted from assessing how law-enforcement programs should be 
funded, the biases that often play out in law-enforcement responses, 
and policing oversight into other criminal justice programs that have 
not served victims or communities well; for example, the collection 
of DNA from all arrestees for minor offenses and even as rape kits 
routinely remain untested. Situating gender-based violence within 
the human rights framework would also put the spotlight on the 
government’s role in preventing violence, which is not emphasized 
in current U.S. anti-violence programming. 
CEDAW ratification would also create new organizing 
opportunities for the movement. As others have discussed, much of 
the advocacy has framed ratification as a symbolic act to affirm the 
United States in its role as a women’s rights leader.108 Anti-violence 
107. See, e.g., Andrea Smith et al., The Color of Violence: Introduction, in
COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 1, 9-10 (INCITE! Women of Color 
Against Violence ed., 2006). In 2010, the NoVo Foundation launched Move to End 
Violence, a ten-year initiative to build up leadership and social change capacity 
among advocates working to end violence against women and girls in the United 
States. Move to End Violence: A Program of the NoVo Foundation, MOVE TO END
VIOLENCE, http://www.movetoendviolence.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). In 
2012, Move to End Violence released a vision statement that served as a starting 
point for hundreds of conversations and debate across the United States regarding 
the direction of the anti-violence movement. MOVE TO END VIOLENCE, NOVO
FOUND., BUILDING MOVEMENT CONVERSATIONS: A CONVERSATION GUIDE:
ENGAGING TO END VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS AND WOMEN THROUGH THE MOVE TO 
END VIOLENCE VISION & PIVOTS, available at 
http://www.movetoendviolence.org/sites/default/files/building_movement_conversat
ions_guide_english.pdf.
108. Marsha A. Freeman, Keynote Address at the Michigan State University 
Law Review Symposium on Whether the U.S. Should Become a Party to the U.N. 
382 Michigan State Law Review 2014:357
advocates, for the most part, have not talked about how ratification 
would affirmatively support efforts to end violence in the United 
States. This has been a strategy choice—but thus far, an unsuccessful 
one. Advocates could use the ratification process to organize around 
the need to improve the United States’ own responses to gender-
based violence, including law-enforcement accountability. The 
process could be a means to engage the public in a more affirmative 
framework of human rights and positive rights to life, security, and 
equality to advance the anti-violence agenda.109 And if CEDAW is 
ratified, the shadow reporting process (and complaints, if the 
Optional Protocol is also ratified) to the CEDAW Committee would 
present a chance to engage communities and create new 
collaborations. Anti-violence advocates have already used 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  shadow 
reports to highlight serious problems with how the United States 
addresses violence against women, and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee recently listed two issues relating to violence 
against women as topics for the United States to address as part of its 
review.110 While this advocacy usefully linked freedom from 
violence against women to other civil and political rights, using the 
CEDAW reporting process would connect gender-based violence 
with other pressing women’s rights issues. It could forge deeper ties 
between ending gender-based violence and other gender justice 
work, including reproductive rights and equality in the workplace.
These links are vital given the continuing attacks on reproductive 
freedom for women (including sexual-assault survivors) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(Nov. 7, 2013).
109. Schneider et al., supra note 62, at 117-18.
110. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DIMMING THE BEACON OF 
FREEDOM: U.S. VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 25-28, 30-33 (2006), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/iccprreport20060620.pdf; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, RACE & ETHNICITY IN AMERICA: TURNING A BLIND EYE TO INJUSTICE 25, 27-
28, 32, 114-19, 163 (2007), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/
pdfs/humanrights/cerd_full_report.pdf; United Nations, Human Rights Comm., List 
of Issues in Relation to the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America 
(CCPR/C/USA/4 and Corr. 1), 107th Sess., Mar. 11-28, 2013, at 4-5, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/Q/4 (Apr. 29, 2013).
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ongoing resistance of many employers to respond to sexual and 
domestic violence in meaningful ways.111
CONCLUSION
International human rights law provides powerful insights for 
reforming law-enforcement responses to gender-based violence in 
the United States. While U.S. advocates already are integrating 
human rights arguments and strategies into their work, CEDAW 
ratification would add much momentum to these efforts. Survivors 
and advocates could then point to CEDAW as a source of persuasive 
authority for understanding gender-based violence as sex 
discrimination, the government’s duty to protect, the right to a 
remedy, and the need to use an intersectionality analysis. The 
framing of gender-based violence as a human rights violation, 
closely connected to other forms of discrimination, would bring the 
experiences of survivors who face multiple layers of oppression to 
the fore. This shift is essential in order to transform the experiences 
of survivors who access the criminal justice system.
111. See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., WHO DECIDES? THE 
STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 16, 22-23 
(2012), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/2011-
who-decides.pdf; Rape in the Fields, FRONTLINE PBS (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/social-issues/rape-in-the-fields/transcript-
46/; WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, KEEPING AMERICA’S WOMEN 
MOVING FORWARD 18-23 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/email-files/womens_report_final_for_print.pdf; Meg Hobday, 
Domestic Violence Comes to Work: The Need for a Work-Related Response, BENCH 
& B. (Mar. 1, 2010), http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/03/domestic-violence-comes-to-
work/.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
